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Abstract. The adversarial attacks against deep neural networks on
computer version tasks has spawned many new technologies that help
protect models avoiding false prediction. Recently, word-level adversar-
ial attacks on deep models of Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks
have also demonstrated strong power, e.g., fooling a sentiment classifica-
tion neural network to make wrong decision. Unfortunately, few previous
literatures have discussed the defense of such word-level synonym sub-
stitution based attacks since they are hard to be perceived and detected.
In this paper, we shed light on this problem and propose a novel defense
framework called Random Substitution Encoding (RSE), which intro-
duces a random substitution encoder into the training process of origi-
nal neural networks. Extensive experiments on text classification tasks
demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework on defense of word-level
adversarial attacks, under various base and attack models.
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Network(DNN) has become one of the most popular frameworks to
harvest knowledge from big data. Despite their success, the robustness of DNNs
has ushered a serious problem, which has prompted the Adversarial attacks on
them. Adversarial attack refers to generating imperceptible perturbed examples
to fool a well-trained DNN model making wrong decisions. In the Computer
Version(CV) domain, adversarial attacks against many famous DNN models
have been shown to be an indisputable threat.
Recently, adversarial attacks on DNN models for Natural Language Process-
ing(NLP) tasks have also received significant attentions. Existing attack methods
can be classified into two categories: character-level attacks and word-level at-
tacks. For character-level attacks, attackers can modify several characters of an
original text to manipulate the target neural network. While character-level at-
tacks are simple and effective, it is easy to defend when deploying a spell check
and proofread algorithm before feeding the inputs into DNNs [14]. Word-level
attacks substitute a set of words in original examples by their synonyms, and
thus can preserve semantic coherence to some extent. The adversarial examples,
? Code available at: https://github.com/Raibows/RSE-Adversarial-Defense
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
00
44
6v
1 
 [c
s.C
L]
  1
 M
ay
 20
20
2 Z. Wang and H. Wang
created by word-level attackers, are more imperceptible for humans and more
difficult for DNNs to defend.
Until now, there are few works on defense of adversarial attacks against NLP
tasks, e.g., text classification. Most efforts had gone into increasing the model
robustness by adding perturbations on word embeddings, e.g., adversarial train-
ing [5] or defensive distillation [12]. Although these approaches exhibit superior
performance than base models, they assume there are no malicious attackers
and couldn’t resist word-level adversarial attacks [17]. The only work against
word-level synonym adversarial attacks is [17]. It proposed a Synonym Encod-
ing Method(SEM) which maps synonyms into same word embeddings before
training the deep models. As a result, the deep models are trained only on these
examples with only fixed synonym substitutions. The reason why SEM based
deep models can defend word-level attacks is that it can transform many unseen
or even adversarial examples ‘move’ towards ‘normal’ examples that base models
have seen. While SEM can effectively defend current best synonym adversarial
attacks, it is too restrictive when the distances are large between transformed
test examples and the limited training examples.
This paper takes a straightforward yet promising way towards this goal.
Unlike modifying word embeddings before the training process, we put the syn-
onyms substitutions into the training process in order to fabricate and feed
models with more examples. To this end, we proposed a dynamic random syn-
onym substitution based framework that introduces Random Substitution En-
coding(RSE) between the input and the embedding layer. We also present a
Random Synonym Substitution Algorithm for the training process with RSE.
The RSE encodes input examples with randomly selected synonyms so as to
make enough labeled neighborhood data to train a robust DNN. Note that the
RSE works in both training and testing procedure, just like a dark glasses dressed
on the original DNN model.
We perform extensive experiments on three benchmark datasets on text clas-
sification tasks based on three DNN base models, i.e., Word-CNN, LSTM and
Bi-LSTM. The experiment results demonstrate that the proposed RSE can ef-
fectively defend word-level synonym adversarial attacks. The accuracy of these
DNN models under RSE framework achieves better performance under popular
word-level adversarial attacks, and is close to the accuracy on benign tests.
2 Related Work
Adversarial attack and defense are two active topics recently. In natural language
processing many tasks are facing the threat of adversarial attack, e.g., Text
Classification [3, 4, 9, 10], Machine Translation [2], Question & Answer [16], etc.
Among them, text classification models are more vulnerable and become the
targets of malicious adversaries. The state-of-the-art adversarial attacks to text
classification in literature can be categorized into the following types:
– Character-level attacks. Attackers can modify a few characters of an orig-
inal text to manipulate the target neural network. Gao et al. [4] proposed
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DeepWordBug, an approach which adds small character perturbations to
generate adversarial examples against DNN classifiers. Ebrahimi et al. [3]
proposed an efficient method, named by Hotflip, to generate white-box ad-
versarial texts to trick a character-level neural network. In [10] and [9], text
adversarial samples were crafted in both white-box and black-box scenarios.
However, these approaches are easy to defend by placing a word recognition
model before feeding the inputs into neural network [13].
– Word-level attacks. Word-level attacks substitute words in original texts
by their synonyms, and thus can preserve semantic coherence. Liang, et
al. [10] designed three perturbation strategies to generate adversarial sam-
ples against deep text classification models. Alzantot et al. [1] proposed a
genetic based optimization algorithm to generate semantically similar ad-
versarial examples to fool a well-trained DNN classifier. To decrease the
computational cost of attacks, Ren et al. [15] proposed a greedy algorithm,
namely PWWS, for text adversarial attack. Word-level adversarial examples
are more imperceptible for humans and more difficult for DNNs to defend.
There exists very few works on defending word-level text adversarial attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, [17] is the only work on defenses against syn-
onym substitution based adversarial attacks. They proposed Synonym Encoding
Method (SEM), that encodes synonyms into same word embeddings to eliminate
adversarial perturbations. However, it needs an extra encoding stage before the
normal training process and is limited on the fixed synonym substitution. Our
framework adopt a unified training process and provide a flexible synonym sub-
stitution encoding scheme.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we firstly present the problem of adversarial attack and defense
in text classification tasks. Next we provide preliminaries about attack model:
several typical word-level synonym adversarial attacks.
3.1 Problem Definition
Given a trained text classifier F : X → Y, X and Y denote the input and the
output space respectively. Suppose there is an input text x ∈ X , the classifier
can give a predicted true label ytrue based on a posterior probability P .
argmax
yi∈Y
P (yi|x) = ytrue (1)
An adversarial attack on classifier F is defined that the adversary can
generate a adversarial example x′ by adding an imperceptible perturbation ∆x,
such that:
argmax
yi∈Y
P (yi|x′) 6= ytrue
s.t. x′ = x+ ∆x, ‖∆x‖p< 
(2)
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where ‖· ‖p denotes the p-norm and  controls the small perturbation so that the
crafted example is imperceptible to humans.
The defense against adversarial attack requires to train an enhanced text
classifier F ∗ over F . A successful defense means that for a given input text
example x, the attacker failed to craft an adversarial example, or the generated
adversarial example x′ could not fool the classifier F ∗.
argmax
yi∈Y
P (yi|x′) = argmax
yi∈Y
P (yi|x) = ytrue (3)
3.2 Synonym Adversarial Attacks
To ensure the perturbation small enough, the adversarial examples need to sat-
isfy semantic coherence constraints. An intuitive way to craft adversarial exam-
ples is to replace several words in the input examples by their synonyms. Let
x = w1, · · · , wn denotes an input example, where wi ∈W denotes a word. Each
word wi has a synonym candidate set Si. For a synonym adversarial attack, ad-
versary can substitute K words denoted by Cx, to craft an adversarial example
x′ = w′1 · · ·w′n:
w′i =
{
wi if wi /∈ Cx
sji if wi ∈ Cx
(4)
where sji denotes the jth substitution candidate word in Si.
Note that the computational cost to find an adversarial example in the search-
ing space will take exponential time. Existing synonym substitution based adver-
sarial attacks had gone into proposing fast searching algorithms, such as Greedy
Search Algorithm(GSA) [7] and Genetic Algorithm (GA) [1]. [15] propose a fast
state-of-the-art method called Probability Weighted Word Saliency(PWWS),
which considers the word saliency and the classification confidence.
4 The Proposed Framework
In this section, we first present our motivation, and then demonstrate the detailed
defense framework.
4.1 Motivation
There are many possible reasons why DNNs have vulnerabilities to adversarial
attacks. One of pivotal factors comes from the internal robustness of neural
networks. Given a normal example x, suppose x is within the decision boundary
in which the classifier can make a correct prediction, as seen in Fig.1(a). However,
attackers can craft an adversarial example x′ in the neighborhood of x such that
the classifier will make a wrong prediction on x′.
For word-level adversarial attack, adversarial examples within neighborhood
of normal examples are generally created by substituting parts of words in the
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Training example
Adversarial example
Transformed inputs
Random samplings
Fig. 1. Decision boundary around normal example.
text by their synonyms. Therefore a judicious solution is to encode synonyms
into same embeddings [17], and use the modified embeddings to train neural
networks as well as test an example. However, this method doesn’t enlarge the
decision boundary too much because the number of training examples doesn’t
increase. Thus under this encoding, a carefully crafted adversarial example may
or may not go through the decision boundary. From Fig.1(b) we can see that
under such encodings, adversarial example x′ may be mapped to x′1(defense fail)
or x′2(defense successful).
In this paper, we apply a different way to generate more robust word em-
beddings. We randomly involve neighborhood examples of all training data into
the model training process. The neighborhood examples come from random syn-
onym substitution and they share the same label as the original example. Thus
the decision boundary of one example may be expanded to cover most unseen
neighborhood examples including adversarial examples, as shown in Fig.1(c).
Note that we did not generate infinite neighborhood examples for a training
data, and even if we generate a large number of neighborhood examples over
one training example in advance, the training time is also very expensive.
To address this challenge, we adopt a dynamic synonym substitution strategy
in the training process and the number of training data remains unchanged. As
presented in Fig.1(c), a neighborhood example(a green circle) replaces the origi-
nal example(the blue circle) to involve in the training process in an epoch. Thus
different neighborhood examples are generated and work in different epochs. In
the test process, test examples are also required to randomly substitute some
synonyms. As a result, no matter an unseen example(may be adversarial) x′ are
mapped to x′1, x
′
2 or x
′
3, the model can also give the correct prediction. We give
the details of our framework in the next subsection.
4.2 Framework Specification
Given a set of training examples {xi, yi}N , a text classification model M with
parameter θ, the objective of M is to minimize the negative log-likelihood:
min
θ
{
L(θ) := −
N∑
i
log P (yi|xi; θ)
}
(5)
To make the decision boundary more refined and ease the training load, our
approach do not generate many labeled examples in advance. We dynamically
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Fig. 2. The proposed RSE framework
generate neighborhood examples instead of original examples in every epoch of
the training process. To this end, we proposed a dynamic random synonym sub-
stitution based framework RSE that introduces a Random Substitution Encoder
between the input and the embedding layer. Then the training objective is to
minimize:
min
θ
{
−
N∑
i
rand
‖δi‖<
log P (yi|xi + δi; θ)
}
(6)
where rand denotes the random synonym substitution operation, and ‖δi‖< 
guarantees that the generated example xi + δi stays in the neighborhood of xi.
Since rand operation doesn’t need an optimization, we can fuse random syn-
onym substitution and encodes the inputs into a new embeddings in real time
in the training process of model M. Fig.2 illustrates the representation of the
proposed framework.
From Fig.2, we can see that RSE reads an input text and encodes it to an
embedding using a random synonym substitution algorithm. For example, given
an original example x = w1 · · ·wn, RSE outputs a neighborhood x′ and feeds
the embedding x′e = e1 · · · en into the subsequent model M. Then model M is
trained on the perturbed examples. Here M can be one of any specific DNN
models in NLP tasks and in this paper we focused on text classification model
such as CNN and LSTM.
4.3 Random Synonym Substitution Algorithm
Next we introduce the details of RSE and the training process under the proposed
framework. In practice, to satisfy the constraints ‖δi‖< , we adopt a substitution
rate sr instead of neighborhood radius . There are three steps to generate a
neighborhood x′ for original example x. Firstly, we select a substitution rate
sr between a minimal rate rmin and a maximal rate rmax. Then secondly we
randomly sample a candidate words set C in which will be substituted. Finally
we randomly chose synonyms for all words in C. Algorithm1 presents the details
of these steps as well as the while training process.
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In the test stage, a test example also need to be encoded under the proposed
RSE in order to mitigate the possible adversarial noise. For example, given a
test example x, we firstly transform it to a representation of its neighborhood
x′ by performing an algorithm(Line 4-6 in Algorithm1). Then the embedding is
fed into the well-trained model to give a prediction.
Algorithm 1: Training for the RSE framework
Input: Training data D = {xi, yi}N , model prameter θ, minimal rate rmin and
maximal rate rmax
1 for epoch = 1 · · ·Nep do
2 for minibatch B ⊂ D do
3 for original example x ∈ B do
4 Sample a substitution rate sr between rmin and rmax;
5 Sample candidate words set C using Eq();
6 Sample synonyms for all words in C to generate x′;
7 Replace x with x′ in B.
8 end
9 Update θ using gradient ascent of log-likelihood 6 on minibatch B.
10 end
11 end
5 Experiments
We evaluate the performance of the proposed RSE framework experimentally in
this section. We first present the experiment setup, and then report the exper-
iment results on three real-world datasets. The evaluate results show that our
RSE achieves much better performance in defending adversarial examples .
5.1 Experiment Setup
In this subsection we give an overview of the datasets, target model, attacker
model and baselines used in our experiments.
Datasets. We test our RSE framework on three benchmark datasets: IMDB,
AG’s News and Yahoo! Answers.
IMDB [11] is a dataset for binary sentiment classification containing 25,000
highly polarized movie reviews for training and 25,000 for testing.
AG’s News [18] is extracted from news articles using only the title and de-
scription fields. It contains 4 classes, and each class includes 30,000 training
samples and 1900 testing examples.
Yahoo! Answers [18] is a topic classification dataset with 10 classes, which
contains 4,483,032 questions and corresponding answers. We sampled 150,000
training data and 5,000 testing data from the original 1,400,000 training data
and 60,000 testing data for the following experiments. Each class contains 15,000
training data and 500 testing data, respectively.
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We also use padding length when preprocessing the input text. The padding
length is decided by each datasets’ average sentence length. Table 1 lists the
detailed description of the aforementioned datasets.
Table 1. The statistic and preprocessing settings for each dataset
Dataset
# of
Training samples
# of
Testing samples
# of
Vocab words
Padding length
IMDB 25,000 25,000 80,000 300
AG’s News 120,000 7,600 80,000 50
Yahoo! Answers 150,000 5,000 80,000 100
Base Models. We used three main classic deep neural networks as base models
in our RSE framework for text classification task: LSTM, Bi-LSTM and Word-
CNN.
LSTM has a 100-dimension embedding layer, two LSTM layers where each
LSTM cell has 100 hidden units and a fully-connected layer.
Bi-LSTM also has a 100-dimension embedding layer, two bi-directional LSTM
layers and a fully-connected layer. Each LSTM cell has 100 hidden units.
Word-CNN [6] has two embedding layers, one is static for pretrained word
vectors, and another is non-static for training, three convolutional layers with
filter size of 3, 4, and 5 respectively, one 1D-max-pooling layer and a fully-
connected layer.
Attack Models. We adopt three synonym substitution adversarial attack mod-
els to evaluate the effectiveness of defense methods. We suppose attackers can
obtain all testing examples of three datasets (IMDB, AG’s News, Yahoo! An-
swers) and can call prediction interfaces of any models at any time.
Random. We first randomly choose a set of candidate words that has syn-
onyms. Then keep replacing the original word in the candidate set with a ran-
domly synonym until the target model predicts wrong.
Textfool [8] uses sorted word candidates based on the word similarity rank
to replace with the synonym and keep perform until the target model predicts
wrong. We will not use the typos substitution because we pay most attention to
synonyms replacements attacks.
PWWS [16] is a greedy synonym replacement algorithm called Probability
Weighted Word Saliency (PWWS) that considers the word saliency as well as
the classification probability. As the same, we only use synonym replacements
but not specific named entities replacements.
Baseline. We take NT, AT and SEM as three baselines in this paper. NT is
a normal training framework without taking any defense methods. AT [5] is an
adversarial training framework, where extra adversarial examples are generated
to train a robust model. We adopt the same adversarial training configurations
as in [17], which use PWWS to generate 10% adversarial examples from each
dataset for every normal trained neural networks. Then the adversarial examples
and original training examples will be mixed for the training process. SEM [17]
is an adversarial defense framework which inserts a fixed synonym substitution
encoder before the input layer of the model. We will evaluate our framework and
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baseline frameworks by using LSTM, Bi-LSTM and Word-CNN as base models
respectively.
5.2 Evaluations
We evenly sampled each class from the origin test data to form 1,000 clean
test examples for every datasets. Then these examples are used to generate
adversarial examples by the above attack models, which will take NT, AT, SEM
and the proposed RSE as the victim targets.
Table 2. The evaluation results under different settings.
Dataset Attack Model
LSTM (%) Bi-LSTM (%) Word-CNN (%)
NT AT RSE NT AT RSE NT AT RSE
IMDB
No attack 88.8 87.9 87.0 89.5 88.7 86.5 87.6 86.3 87.8
Random 80.6 77.8 83.1 81.5 79.2 81.9 77.5 75.0 83.0
Textfool 75.4 76.2 84.2 74.6 77.0 83.7 71.2 71.0 83.1
PWWS 26.3 29.3 82.2 27.3 28.1 79.3 13.5 10.5 81.2
AGs News
No attack 90.5 92.6 92.9 96.4 94.5 94.1 95.9 96.9 94.8
Random 84.7 87.9 89.2 91.4 89.7 92.2 91.6 92.6 93.1
Textfool 79.6 85.3 88.7 86.3 89.1 90.6 88.0 92.6 92.2
PWWS 63.0 72.8 84.2 70.4 78.0 88.3 67.5 77.1 89.9
Yahoo!
Answers
No attack 72.5 73.1 72.1 73.2 72.7 71.8 71.2 66.0 70.1
Random 60.5 65.1 68.6 61.2 64.2 68.9 58.9 54.3 67.3
Textfool 58.9 63.4 67.4 60.4 63.6 67.1 57.9 56.2 66.4
PWWS 29.1 39.3 64.3 26.3 39.2 64.6 28.8 26.8 62.6
The key metrics to evaluate the performance of different defense frameworks
in this paper are Accuracy, Accuracy Shift and Attack-Success Rate. Accuracy
refers to the ratio that the number of correctively predicted examples against
the total number of test examples. Accuracy Shift refers to the reduced accu-
racy before and after attacks. Attack-Success Rate is defined by the number of
successfully attacked examples by attack models against the number of correctly
predicted examples with no attack. It can be computed by the following:
(Accuracy Shift)/(No attack Accuracy) (7)
The better defense performance the target model has, the lower Attack-Success
Rate the attacker gets.
Table 2 shows the accuracy results of base models(LSTM, Bi-LSTM and
Word-CNN ) against various attack models (Random, Textfool, PWWS ) under
NT, AT, and the proposed RSE defense framework. For each base model with
each dataset, we highlight the highest classification accuracy for different defense
frameworks in bold to indicate the best defense performance.
From table 2, we can easily see the following observations when looking at
each box to find the best accuracy result:
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1. When there is no attack, NT or AT usually haves the best accuracy. But once
under other attack models, our RSE framework can get the best accuracy.
2. For each column in each box, target models have the lowest accuracy un-
der PWWS attack, which demonstrates PWWS is the most effective attack
model. The accuracy of NT and AT drop significantly under PWWS at-
tack. But our RSE behaves the best defense ability that it has a very small
accuracy loss compared with ‘No attack’.
3. Under different settings (various datasets, attack models and base models),
our RSE framework always has a good performance with little accuracy
decrease. This demonstrates the generalization of the proposed framework
to strengthen a robust deep model against synonym adversarial attacks.
Table 3. SEM VS. RSE under PWWS attack model.
Metric % Base Model
IMDB AGs News Yahoo! Answers
SEM RSE SEM RSE SEM RSE
Before-Attack
Accuracy
LSTM 86.8 87.0 90.9 92.9 69.0 72.1
Bi-LSTM 87.6 86.5 90.1 94.1 70.2 71.8
Word-CNN 86.8 87.8 88.7 94.8 65.8 70.1
After-Attack
Accuracy
LSTM 77.3 82.2 85.0 84.2 54.9 64.3
Bi-LSTM 76.1 79.3 81.1 88.3 57.2 64.6
Word-CNN 71.1 81.2 67.6 89.9 52.6 62.6
Accuracy Shift
LSTM 9.5 4.8 5.9 8.7 14.1 7.8
Bi-LSTM 11.5 7.2 9.0 5.8 13.0 7.2
Word-CNN 15.7 6.6 21.1 4.9 13.2 7.5
Attack-Success
Rate
LSTM 10.94 5.52 6.49 9.36 20.43 10.82
Bi-LSTM 13.13 8.32 9.99 6.16 18.52 10.03
Word-CNN 18.09 7.52 23.79 5.17 20.06 10.70
RSE vs. SEM. We also compared SEM with our RSE framework as shown
in table 3. Please note that we evaluate the performance of RSE and SEM
only under PWWS attack model on three datasets because: (1) PWWS has the
strongest attacking efficacy; and (2) SEM has no opened source codes yet and
we directly cite the results in [17] under the same experimental settings.
It can also be seen from Table 3 that the After-Attack Accuracy of RSE are
mostly higher than SEM for about 5%-10%. Since the parameters of each base
model may be different, we compare the Accuracy Shift of SEM and RSE. We
find out that except for AGs News dataset with LSTM model, models under
our framework have smaller Accuracy Shift, and the shifts are stable with only
5% decrease in average. But for SEM the decrease is about 10% in average. For
AGs News dataset with Word-CNN model, the Accuracy Shift reaches 21.1%
and thus this shift make the performance of the model very poor. We can also
see that our RSE have lower Attack-Success Rate for nearly all settings. This
means that it is more difficult for PWWS attacker to craft adversarial examples
under RSE framework.
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Substitution Rate. When crafting an adversarial example, it is better to add
smaller perturbations. Thus noisy rate is an important metric in adversarial
attack. If the noisy rate is high, it means that the crafted example may not
be imperceptible. On the contrary, if a defense mechanism causes the attacker
add more noise to success, the defense mechanism is better. Thus in this paper
we introduce Substitution Rate as a metric, which is defined as the number
of substituted words against the sentence length. The better performance the
defense framework has, the more the substituted words attack model costs.
Table 4. Performance on Substitution Rate.
Dataset Attacker
LSTM (%) Bi-LSTM (%) Word-CNN (%)
NT AT RSE NT AT RSE NT AT RSE
IMDB
Textfool 17.98 18.22 20.09 17.63 18.26 20.06 17.57 17.35 20.03
PWWS 10.54 11.23 19.13 10.55 11.25 18.12 6.41 5.36 17.99
AGs News
Textfool 20.93 21.27 22.18 21.18 21.39 22.11 22.09 21.59 22.17
PWWS 19.07 20.88 21.66 20.09 21.44 22.20 19.35 20.75 23.08
Yahoo!
Answers
Textfool 13.69 14.19 13.25 13.59 14.29 13.38 13.88 13.71 13.50
PWWS 10.28 12.47 16.09 9.79 12.85 16.30 10.30 9.74 16.21
The table 4 shows the Substitution Rate of each base model without (NT)
or with defend frameworks (AT and RSE). We could not list the results of
SEM since they did not report in [17]. From table 4 it could be seen that the
Substitution Rate for attacking the models with RSE is over 20% in most cases,
better than NT and AT frameworks. So we can safely conclude that RSE makes
the attackers pay more cost for perturbing origin sentences.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we propose a defense framework called RSE, to protect text clas-
sification models against word-level adversarial attack. With this framework, a
random synonym substitution encoder is fused into the deep neural network to
endow base model with robustness to adversarial examples. We introduce and
propose an effective training algorithm for the framework. Extensive experiments
on three popular real-world datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of our frame-
work on defense of word-level adversarial attacks. In the future, we will transfer
our RSE framework into other typical NLP tasks, e.g., Machine Translation and
Question & Answer, to protect deep models from word-leval adversarial attacks.
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